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The argument For allowing
insurance companies accused of
bad faith to have iuries compare
their conduct with that of their
aggrieved insureds or third-party
claimants sounds good enough to

be the product of an

insurance
advertiser's focus group. The Cali-

foniacourt, in Kutght u. Jewett,l sud
of comparative fault in general:
...the "comparative fault"
doctrine is a flexible, commonsense concept, under
which a jury properþ may
consider and evaluate the
relative responsibility of various parties fot an iniury
(whether their responsibility
for the injury rests on negligence, strict liability, or
other theories of responsibility), in order to anive zt
an "equitable . . . apportionment or allocation of loss".

As a promoter of corîplrative fault for insurance, i.e., defense of compatatle bad faith and
reverse bad faith claims, has said,
'T{olding insurers wholly liable for
damages fot which they are only

patly responsible, while allowing
the insured to recovet for selfinflicted harm, offends all notions
of equity and fairness."2
The fact is, in insurance bad
faith claims, comparative fault, and
reverse bad faith are groundless
concepts that should not survive
plaintiffls motions to strike or dismiss. When the specter of comparative bad faith defense andf or reverse bad faith claims arise, counsel shouldbe aware of some excelPecB 34
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lent precedent from Montana and
Cùiforna which should put them
to rest. Judge Molloy recently
struck the comparative bad faith
defense in Burton u. Mountain I[/e$
Fønz Bureaa Muhta/ In¡ørance Com-

pr.J .In doing so, he relied in part
on the Montana Supreme Court's
1993 decision in

Int.

Co.,a a" càse

StEhens u. Safeco

that has not re-

ceived much attention in Montana
but was a significant factor in the
Califotrna Supreme Court's recent
decision in Krønsco u. Anerican Empire Surplus Lines In¡. Co.s in which

that court dealt comp anttve l¡ad
futh a death blow in that state. It
is worth reviewing each of these
decisions to see the holes in the
legal theory of compatztle fault in
insurance bad faith.

'fhe unsung Stephens

u. Safeco

case
Stephens u. Safeco is a good
starting point. Tom and Jodie
Stephens owned Buster's Body
Shop in Hamil¡on when it suffered
an accidental fire in 1987. Disputes

arose when they tried to settle their

claims under their fire policy with
Safeco, so they sued Safeco for
violations of the duty of good farth
zrrÅfur dealing and for violation of
the MontanaUnfak Claims Settle-

ment Practices Act. Safeco was
successful in injecting L compa'rttive bad faith defense into the
pleadings by taking the position
that Stephens also owed Safeco a
duty of good faith and fm dealing.
The jury was asked on a special
verdict form, 'Did plaintiffs violate
any duty of good futh and fair
dealing owed to Safeco?" to which
the they responded 'Yes" on an
11-1 vote. Having concluded that

both parties violated the duty of
good faith and faþ dealing and
allocated causal conduct 530/o to
plarntiffs and 47 7o to Safeco, the
jury awarded $38,333.33 to Tom
Stephens for emotional distress.
Consequentl¡ plaintiffs recovery
was barred by Montana's compara-

tive neglþnce statute, MC¡, S 27r-702.
On appeal, the Montana
Supreme Court held that there
could not be comparative bad faith
where the first-pafty claimant ùleged insurer bad faith tort. Justice
McDonough's succinct and clear
analysis noted first that, in 1983,
the court, in L)pintki a. Title In¡.
Co.,u rccognized that the insurance
company's duty to act in good faith
with their insureds existed independent of the insurance coritract
and independent of statute. He
pointed out tha! on the other
hand, Storyt u. Ciyt of Borynaí had,
held that, absent a "specia) lrlationship," bteach of a contract did
not result in the tort of bad faith.
IIe noted that Story set five criteria
for determining a "special relationship" such as inherently unequal
bargaining position of the patties,
superior position of one par6¡, and
vulnerability of the other party.
McDonough applied the Story crteria in StEhens u. Safeco and determined that the insurance compâny
there was in a superior positìon and
orved the insured a" tort duty of
good faith. For Justice McDonough, in StEhens u. Safeco, the
clear import of Storl was that the
insurer was in the superior position
to owe the duty, and the insured
did not. As the court said in Srorlt,
"The tort of bad faith ...serves to
discourage oppression in contracts
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which necessarily give one party
^
superior position."t Consequently,
while the insurer's conduct in the
special relationship can lead to bad
faith, the insured's conduct can
only amount to breach of a contnct and not to bad faith tort.
Safeco argued rn Stephens
that Marte/ u. Montana Power Comparyl' authorized comparison of
different levels of conduct so as to
allow comparison of the insured's
conduct with that of the insurer.
Recall that Derenbelger a. Iotty,to
had forbidden comparison of different degrees of tort conduct, so
that for instance, an insurer accused of willful or wanton misconduct could not seek comparison of
the insured's ordinary negligence.
In Marlel, the court overturned
Derenbergr sayingtt
We hold, therefore, that all
forms of conduct amount-

ing to neglþnce in

Montana
Pattern

.i
il

,'! ì
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fnstruct¡ons
The Montana Supreme

Court

Commission on Civil Jury lnstructions

(MPl) is committed to developing and
maintaining the best poss¡ble set of

pattern instructions. MPI welcomes

arry

form including but not limited to ordinary neglþnce,
gross neglþnce, willful neg-

suggestions from attorneys, especially

ligence, wanton mis conduct,
reckless conduc! and heedless conduct, zfe to be

in developing areas of the law or in
areas where there are presenfly no

compared with any conduct
that falls short of conduct
intended to cause injury or

published pattern instructions.

damage.

Flowever, t-]lre Stephens murt
noted that in Mørtel they compared
tort conduct to tort conduct.l2 In
Stephens, they refused to allow comparison of the insured's breach of
contract with the insurance compariy's tort conduct, describing
those "two distinctive legal concepts as to liabiliçy and damages"
asl'apples and oranges."tu

Californiats Ktansco case
Many lawyers today recall

lf you have suggestions,
please contact:
Douglas J. Wold, Chairman
Montana Pattern Instructions
P.O. Box 400
Polson, MT 59860
406-883-2500

a,

time when we relied almost entirely
on California cases when arguing
insurance matters before Montana's
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Supreme Court. In June 2000, the
California Supreme Couft relied on

Montana's Stepherc u.

Safeco

in

de-

ciding Kran¡co u. Americm Enpirv
Surþtus Line¡ Ins. Co.,to a landmark

in that state. Kransco began
when a Wisconsin jury shocked
case

California toy maker, Kransco, and
its insurers, American Empire Surplus Lines (ÁES) and International
Insurance Company, by awarding a

discovery and that the

it.y

punished that conduct. Flowever,
Kransco corrected the information
many months before trial, and ÂES
knew, during negotiations before
trial, of the lapse, its correction,
and ptesumably its potential

impoft at tnù.
At the bad faith trial in

California, the court instructed the iury

in "comparative bad faith" assert-

pLttially

that the duty of good faith znd fnr
dealing "is a two-way street" that
also runs from insured to insurer.
Flowever, the court noted that,
based on the "special relationship,"
the insurer's breach is a tort, while

the insured's is contractual only.
Citingthe Montana Supreme Court
"apples and oranges" quote from
StEhens u. Safeco, the California
Supreme Court refused to allow
comparative bad

quadriplegic

plaintiff

fi2.3

million in com-

pens atory
damages and
$1,0 million in
punitive dam-

...the court confirmed that the duty of
good faith and fair dealing "is a two-way street"
that also runs from insured to insurer.

ages. Kransco
and its insurers had rejected plaintiffls offer to settle for $750,000,
offering instead $450,000. The
plaint-iffl Michael Hubert, was an
adult who broke his neck when he
jumped head first onto a bacþard
water slide toy known as a Slipand-Slide. Of importance is the
fact fhzt, during discovery in the
underþing case, Kransco had answered interrogatories wrongly
denying knowledge of any adult
cervical injuries on the Slip-andSlide wher¡ in fact, a product
vice president knew of one case
involving death and another of
quadriplegia. Plaintiffs counsel alluded to those discovery lapses
during the trial which ended in the
$12.3 million iury verdict.
Kransco sued AES alleging breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing for rejecting
plaintiffs offer to settle within limits when there was a substantial
risk of a verdict geatdy in excess
of the limits. ,{ES alleged that
Kransco failed to take ordinary
care for its own safety and that its
neglþnce was the cause of the
loss and damaç at tÅaJ. The basis
for AES's contention was that
Kransco had wrongly answered the
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faith to be used
as an affirmatwe
defense in
^n
insured's action
against its in-

surer for b ad
faith. In doing
so, the court over-

ing that the covenant of good faith
and fafu dealing applied to both the
insurer and the insured, and that, if
Kransco did arrything that would
injure AES's right to receive the

ruled Caliþmia Casualry Cen. Ins.
Co. a. Søperior Courft which had
been the seminal California case

benefits of the insurance agreement, Krartsco's recovery would
be proportionately reduced by
comparative fault attributable to it.
The court also instructed in compantwe neglþnce to the effect
that arry neglþnce of Kransco in
preparing for trial, which negligence was a câuse of the dzmage
verdict in Hubert u. Kransco, would

fault in an insurance bad faith case.
The court reasoned that the Cølifor-

reduce Kransco's recovery against
AES in proportion to the amount

of fault attributable to Kransco.
The iury in the bad faith trial assessed compensatory darnzges at
$L3.6 million and found Kransco
90o/o at fault for its own damages.
Flowever, on post-trial motions,
the trial court concluded it had
erred in instructing on either theory

of comparative fault: comparative
bad faith or comparative negligence. The Court of Appezl affirmed the trial court in this, and
the issues of comparative bad faith
and comparative neglþnce went
to the CùifornzSupreme Court.
There, the court confirmed

recognizing "comparative bad
fùth" as a form of comparative
niø Casualry case would not withstand the scrutiny of cases distinguishing Ln insurer's tortious
breach of the covenant of good
faith from an insured's breach of
contract. As the court said, "the
Califotnz Casualty court's holding
is grounded on the faulty premise
that the obligations of insurer and
insured-and thus their bad faithnot."76
arc compatzble. They
The court noted ^te
that insurers
have adequate remedies for the
insured's breaches. For example,
the insured's misconduct may be
used to avoid insurer liability for
bad faith by showing that the insurer acted reasonably under the
circumstances. Or, the insured's
breach may be actionable as a
breach of contract, and the insurer
may simply avoid coverage on the
basis of material misrepresentation
or breach of wauanLy.
The Kransco court also held it
error to instruct in comparative
Tnrnr- Tnn¡¡DS - WTNTEn 2001

neglþnce. The court said that a
third-party insurer is not shielded
from "full responsibility for its bad
faith failure to settle a case even if
the insured's litìgation misconduct

or mishandling of the claim inflated the size of the verdic! alI

I
I

t

i
;

l
i
l

though as noted, evidence of such
misconduct may support contract
defenses, cross claims or separate
causes of action for breach of the
terms of the insurance contract
otherwis e av ailable."l1

Judge Mosk, in his concurring opinion, succinctly stated the
reason for saddling only the insurer
with the risk of bad faith tort in the
breach of insurance contracts:18
We have done so in order to
extend to individual insureds
in individual cases against individual insurers the remedies
of the law of torts, which are
broader and deeper than
those of the law of contracts.
And we have done that in
order to attempt to true the
balance in the relationship between insurers and insureds
generally in the wodd a;tlmge
a balarrce that we have

found to be skewed in fzvot
insurers and against

of

insureds - by providing
further deterrents against
nonperformarrce on the part
of insurers to the detriment
of insureds.

As a result of the

Kransco

of comparative
faith
bad
and comparative neglicase, the defenses

gence in bad faith actions arc dead

inCahfonia.
Federal Judge Molloy's Bufton
v. Mountain lVest case
Judge Molloy confronred the
compantive fault insurance defenses in Burlon u. Mourutain lYest
Farm Bureau Mutuøl Ins. Co. which
he decided on November 15, 2000.
Michael Burton was a passenger
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injured in an auto driven by Bonnie
Truscott and insured by Mountain
West. Burton settled his third-paty
claims against Truscott and then
brought first- and third-party
claims against Mountain West. As
z fitst-pafty "insured," he alleged
that Mountain West failed to inform him that the $5,000 limits of
Medical Pay coverage available on
three other cars owned by their
insured, Truscott, were potentially
avulat¡Ie to him under "stacking."
By way of third-party claim, Burton alleged the carrier ultimately
required him to agree that zny
stacked medical pay coverages
would be an advance against his
recovery as a third-pafly claimznt
and also failed to promptly and
fairly investigate and settle his
claim. Mountain West answered
the common law insutance bad
faith claim with an affirmative defense of compantle bad faith.
At this point, it is necessary
to recall a bit of history of insurance bad faith law in Montana:
Remember that the legislature, in
L987, codified first-party and thirdparty causes of action against insurers in an attempt to do away
with common law bad faith."
F{owever, the Montana Supreme
Court, in Brewington u. Employrc Fire
lns, C0.," subsequently held that
the statute's prohibition on "any
other theory or cause of action"

(referring to common law bad
faith) did not preempt common

law claims for third-party bad faith
but did for first-party. Accordingl¡
Mountain West contended that,
since passenger Burton was a firstparry "insured" under the Medical
Pay coverage, he could not bring a
common law bad faith claim in any
event. However, Mountain West
also contended that both the firstp^tty and third-party claims
sounded in tort so as to invoke
their affirmative defense seeking
to compare some conduct of But-

ton. Burton moved to strike the
defense.

From the start,Judge Molloy
seemed bothered by the fivzy
catch-all nature of the comparative
bad faith defense being raised. He
,

s

,27

alcl:

Mountain West's second affirmative defense blends the
doctrine of contributory or
comparative negliçnce, the
concept of an affirmative defense, and the reciprocal nature of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing. The mixhrre
of these three things does not
sit well with the court.

Judge Molloy pointed our
that the essence of the doctrine o[
comparative negligence is that
plaintiff caused his own injuries
and not that plaintiff breached a
duty owed defendant. Mountain
ì7est argued not that Burton
caused his injudes, but that his
misconduct influenced Mountain
West so as to give it the
"reasonable basis in law or fzct"
which provides an insurer a stalutory defense to an "independent
action" allowable under MC,q, S3318-242. Accordingl¡ Judge Molloy
struck Mountain West's compàrative bad faith defense, on the
ground that the statutory
"reasonable basis in law or fzct"
defense was adequate, and the
comparative bad faith defense inappropriate. The judge further
asserted that, if Mountain West
contended Burton's misconduct
injured it, it could file a counterclaim which would necessarily entail a showing that Burton owed
the insurer a duty the breach of
which was the proximate cause of
damages to the insurer and v¡hich
damages it would have to prove.
Was

tuedeman

v.

National

.Fatmets UnÍon a comparative

fault case?
pecp 37

of a case in which the Montana

the proverbial stake has been
driven through the heart of
"compatatíve bad faith" in both
fìrst and third-party actions

Supreme Court "effectively recog-

against insurers

Interestingl¡ Juedenan u. National Farwer¡ Union PmPerfl dY Casualg, C0.," is cited as an example

nized comparatwe fault when it
\¡/as not so described."23 In Juedema.ft, child passenger in a vehicle
^ by Bennyhoff was iniured
driven
so severely as to merit Payment of
the liability policy limits in settlement of his claim. His mother
made the demand but refused to
release the insured defendant from

apotential claim for loss of consor-

tium. Consequentl¡ the insurer
refused to tender payment. In the
resulting bad faith claim brought
by the claimants, the trial court
granted summary judgment for the
insurer. The Montana Supreme

Court upheld the iudgmeflt, relsorung that claimant's conduct in
refusing to agree to a release in
return for payment of the limits of

the policy 'þrevented

Farmers

Union from effectuattnga prompt,
fur and equitable settlement."'"
Juednman was subsequently
overnrled on its core holding regarding plaintiffs refusal to sign a
release. In l{/atTers u. Cuaranþt National lns. Co.," the court held it to
be bad faith for an insuter in a. clezr
liability "limits" case to condition
settlement on execution of a full
and final release. The Jøedernan case
contains no discussion of any concept of compatative fault, has not
been recognized in Montana as
authority fot any comparative fault
defense, and would be weak authority given that fhe \l/atTers decision overnrled its holding on the
propriety of making the claimant
sþ a full release where liability is
clear and the limits inadequate.
tuedenan aside, reflection
on the Montana Supreme Court's
decision in Stephew u. Safeco and
Judge Molloy's decision in Burton
u. Mountain lT/est indicztes that
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to transmute such
a contractual breach into a
tort. Such circumstances do

necessaqF

not exist in the context of an
insured's responsibilities toward its insurer, or in the
reciprocal context of an insurer's legitimate expectations from its insured
Ilence an insured does not
bear a risk of affirrr.ztive
tort liability for failing to
perform the panoply of indefinite but fiduciary-like
oblþations contained within
the concept of "insurance
bad fairh."

in Montana. For

the "independent cause of action" under MCA 533-18-242,

the insurer is given

the
"reasonable basis in law or fact"
defense for denying the claim,
and comparative fault concepts
of comparative bad faith ot comparative negligence a,re not
provided in the statute. The coutts
have simply found such comparative
fault concepts inapptopriate fi¡t
cases involvinginsurer bad faith.

The fate of ssreverse bad faith"
claims
A good horror show often
ends with a hint that the monster
might still be alive providing the
possibility of a sequel. Ever creative insurets, when reading Judge
Molloy's reference to their recourse of counterclaiming against
the insured, if they can prove his
duty, breach, cause and damage,
might be expected to assert that
"reverse bad faith" is alive. In the
insurance context, "reverse bad
faith'is defined as tortious breach
of the correnani of good faith and
fair dealing by the insured such as
to provide a claìm for relief to the
insurer.'u The California Appellate Court recently treated this
specter to wol fbane in Agricultural
Ins. Co. u. Superior Coart."' The
reasoning, quoted in Kransco, will
sound familiar:28

An insurer has no

claim

toft for
breach of the covenant of
good faith and fm dealing.
Â breach of this covenant is,
against its insured in

at base, a breacÌr ofcontract.
relationship including spe-

'{.
cialized circumstances of re-

liance and dependence

is

.

In

fact, reverse bad faith has received poor reception in most
^
appellate courts. Douglas Richmond, a proponent of reverse bad
faith, after reviewing the reported
decisions in a laut review article in
7996, reported that "no appellate
court has published a decision recognizing reverse bad fzith as a
cause of action absent a statute
conferring the right to bring such a
clttm."2e (R.eferring to court recognition of z clairr, based on a Tennessee statute.) While juries have
been instructed in teverse bad faith
and even returned verdicts, the appellate courts reject the cause of
action. Neveftheless, the insurer is
not without recourse and has such

claims

fot relief as fraud

and

breach of contract to remedy the
insuted's misconduct. In the Agricultural Ins. Co. u. Superior Court
case, even though the appellate
court sustained the demurrer to the
reverse bad fairh claim, it set aside

the trial court's order sustaining
the demurrer to the fraud claim.
The court

said:30

...an insuted must not defraud in making a clzim
under the policy. When an
insured makes a claim to its

TrunrTnnNDS - WTNTER

Forensic
Ghiropractic
Examination

insurer, the insurer's duty to investigate is trþ
If, because of the insured's false factual
assertions, the insurer incurs expenses that
would otherwise not have been necessary, justifiable detrimental reliance can be pleaded by
the insurer. ,A.lthough a mere inflated opinion
of a claim's value is not fraud, deliberately false
fac¡nl, asserLions can be fraud. There is a signiûcant distinction between â mere agressive
claims position and an outrigþt factual fraud.
gered.

Conclusion
Under Montana case law and the lJnfaL Claims
Settlement Practices
it is the insurance com'{.ct31,
pany that, because of its special relationship, must
meet certain duties in the handling of claims. The
first-party clztmant need only meet the notice and
claim requirements of the insurance policy, and both
fitst- and third-parties must not defraud in making

If

the insured or third-pafty clzimant
brings abzd fertth claim against the insure r, Çorrrpatathe claim.

tive fault concepts such as comparative bad faith and
comparative negligence have no legal basis in
Montana. Consequently, an affumative defense of
comparative bad faith should be the subject of a
successful motion to strike.
In Montana, a reverse bad faith tort claim
should fall in the face of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a clitrr. upon which relief can be
granted. Insofar as Montana courts rccognze any
covenant on the paú of an insured for good faith and
fir dezlìng it is entirely crearture of the insurance
contract, and its breach^is a contract breach that
won't support a tort claim for reverse bad faith and
cannot be subject to comparative fault defenses such
as comparative bad fzirh or neglþnce. Stephens u.
Safeco and Burton u. Mountøin lY/est in Montana and
Kran¡co u. Arzerican Enpire and Agricaltural In¡. Co. a.
SuþeriorCourtinCalifonia all express a consistent and
well reasoned approach to dealing with the defenses
of compantsve bad faith or comparative neglþnce in
a bzd fairh claim. Those defenses and the tort claim
of reverse bad faith, like werervolves and vampires,
are but scary illusions and should be struck by trial
courts when they Lppear. '{.fter editing this, Pat
Sheehy said that they ate really more like the pod
persons in the movie, Nzght of the L-iuing Dead. '\ou
can kill them many times, but they just keep coming
back under some other guise. It would be nice if the
consumer's bar could just find these defenses in their
'pod person' stage and get them all then. But fhat's a
different movie."
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Personal review of medical-chiropractic
records.

/
/
/

Independent chiropractic examinations.
Professional opinions rendered.
Consultation regarding records and
forensic IME examinations.

Dr. Thomas C. Donahue
Chiropractic Doctor, Master of Science Rehabilitation Counseling (MSU), Certifi ed
Chiropractic Sports Physician (ACA Sports
Council), Certified Disability Evaluator Category
I (NADEP), Certified Independent Chiropractic
Examiner (ABIME), Certified Independent
Forensic Chiropractic Medical Examiner
(NBOFC), Certified Disability Impairment Rater
(NAAIRP), and Diplomate American Board of
Forensic Professionals (ABFP).

For more information, a copy of I)r.
I)onahue's CV, or questions about
consultationo please call or e-ma¡l:

1-888-2s6-9s69
chiro

s

p ort@m

ontan

a.

com

Dr. Thomas C. Donahue
2520 l7'h St. W. Suite l0l
Billings, MT 59012

Prcn39

Notest. z c¡.

ytÅ,
ain a competitive edge for
at,the Association of
America (ATLA)
February 10-14, in New Orleans.
of ATLA s National College of Ad
education programs and

G

opportunities-all in one
cities.

lEarn approximately

20.5" MCLE and

9.237 Mont.96,752P.2d 140 (1988).
70.207 Mont.l, 674P.2d 485 (1983).
71. Møtel, 7 52 P.zd at 143.
12. Stephens, 852 P.2d at 568-69.

lSample the latest legal services ATLA
offer your practice.
at thé

Reception and Closing Dinner Dance.
"Number of credits

73. Id,
74. Krønvo, 2 P .3d at
13.
75. 77 3 Cal.Âpp.3d 27 4, 218
Cal.Rptr.817 (1985).
76. Kran¡c0,2 P.3d at 72.
77.1d., at76.
78. Id., at 17.
19. Ch. 218,L. 1987; S ee, Muraro, Døelopnent and Statut of Insurance BadFaith in
Montana, Trial Trends, Summer 2000.
20. 7999 II(Í 312, 992 P.zd 237 Qvtont

lt,

0n

method used by
aSency.
of Calþrniø MCLE approoed proaider.

You must be an ATLA member to
For more information on the

or ATLA membership:

'Ù virlt www.atla.org
fl Ur" ATLA s 2l-hour, toll-free
.

El

Demand service at 800-976-2190'.
document # 1300 for convention
or # 1700 for ATLA membership
Phottu 8O0-424-2725 or
(convention) or 202-965-3500, :ext,,
(membership)

d

Send E-mail to
membership@a tlahq.org
9cl*zu¡

I

6%

8.1d., at776.

'credits, including 2 ethics credits.

INetwork with colleagues

q\%lw,$aP.zd

(1ee2).
2. Douglas R. Richmond, The Two-l(/E
Strcet of Invrance BadFaith: Undø Conrtruction, Bat NotYet Open,28 Loyola U.
Chicago LJ. 95, 140 (1996).
3. 27 M.F.R. 331 (2000).
4.258 Mont. L42,852 P.2d 565.
5.23 C^1.4rh390,2P.3d 1 (2000).
6.202Mont.1, 15, 655 P.2d970,977.
7. 242 Mont. 436, 791 P.2d 7 67 (1990).

Teee).

27. Børton, 27 M.F.R aI 333.
22. 253 Mont 27 8, 833 P.Zd 797
(ùIont. 1992).
23. Richmond, suprâ note 2, at 775.
24. Juedman, 833 P.2d
193.
^t
25.2000 MT 153.
26. Rransco, 2 P.3d at 73.
27.70 Cal.App.4th 385 (1999).
28. Id., at 389-390.
29. Richmond, sltþra, rlote 2, at I41.

Rrcrsrnn ny
DEcEIT¡srn L
AND SAVE $1OO

Rnclsr¡n sv
JaNuanv 12
AND SAVE $50.

O:t 4

30. A¿iculturø|, 70 Cal.App.4¡h at 390.
200 I

ATIA

nU ¿ntø

31. MCA $ 33-18-201.

l.atuøtarv

r

MTLA MeMBERs Er,BcrBr Fon Punrrc SBnvrcB
Voters in the 2000 elections put
their trust in several MIT-A members.

Montana's voters. elected MTLA
members to two statewide positions
and to four legislative seats.

Patricia Cotter was' elected as
an Associate Justice of the Montana
Supreme Couft. Pat is a past member of the MTLA Board and formerly chaired MTLÂ's ,\micus
Committee. Justice Cotter was
elected to the seat vacated by the
retiring Justice William Hunt.

PecB4O

brings to his office years of expedence
representìng the interests
con-

MTLA pertinent committee assþmeflts are: Dave Gallik of Helena,
Business and Labor; Christopher
Flarris of Bozeman; Judiciary,
Larry Jent of Bozeman, Human
Services; and Ken Peterson of

srrrners in insurance related disputes.

Billings, Judiciary.

John Morrison was elected as
Monana's State Auditor and Commissioner of Insurance. John is a
past president of MTI-A. Monison

of

Four MTLA members were
elected to seâts in the Montana
House of Representatives. The
perspective they can bring to the
House is much welcomed. The
MTLA members elected and their

"

These four new members of
the House join rwo MTL,A. members who are currently members
of the Montz¡z Senate - Steve
Doherty of Great Falls and Jon

Ellingson of Missoula. .
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